Joyce M. Despain v. Robert V. Despain : Brief of Appellant on Appeal by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
Joyce M. Despain v. Robert V. Despain : Brief of
Appellant on Appeal
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
J. Thomas Greene and H. Russell Hettinger; Greene, Callister & Nebeker; Attorneys for
Respondent;
David S. Dolowitz; Parsons, Behle & Latimer; Attorneys for Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Despain v. Despain, No. 17034 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2272
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
JOYCE M. DESPAIN, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT V. DESPAIN, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF ON. APPEAL 
Case No. 17034 
* * * * * * * 
On Appeal From the Third Judicial District Court 
For Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Presiding 
* * * * * * * 
J. THOMAS GREENE 
RUSSELL HEDINGER 
of and for 
CALLISTER, GREEN & NEBEKER 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 531-7676 
Attorneys for Respondent 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
i9 South State Street 
P. o. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Attorneys for Appellant 
F ~LED 
JUL 2 5 1980 
~-·--·---------- __ .. _________ ,.. ___ ............. -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
JOYCE M. DESPAIN, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT V. DESPAIN, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Case No. 17034 
* * * * * * * 
On Appeal From the Third Judicial District Court 
For Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Presiding 
*. * * * * * * 
J. THOMAS GREENE 
RUSSELL HEDINGER 
of and for 
CALLISTER, GREEN & NEBEKER 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 531-7676 
Attorneys for Respondent 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
79 South State Street 
P. o. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS . 
ARGUMENT • 
CONCLUSION • 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d 864 (Utah 1978) .•... 
Chandler v. West, 610 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1980) .••• 
. 1 
. 1 
. 2 
. 3 
5 
. 10 
• 5' 6 
• 7 
Dehn v~ Dehn, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976) .••• • • • 6 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977) •..• 
Ferguson v. Ferguson, 578 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978) .••.• 
Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2d 435 (Utah 1978) .•••.•. 
Kerr v. Kerr, P.2d (Utah 1980) . • . • • ••. 
Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980). 
State Statutes 
5 
6 
5 
. 7, 8, 9 
• 7 
Section 15-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ..•••••.•• 8 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
JOYCE M. DESPAIN, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT V. DESPAIN, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
* * * * * * * 
APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Case No. 17034 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the Order of Kenneth Rigtrup, one 
of the judges of the Third Judicial District Court, refusing to 
modify a stipulated Decree of Divorce in regard to terminating 
child support at age 21 on the grounds that once the parties had 
entered into an agreement which merged into the Decree, the 
Decree could not be modified. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant filed a motion to modify the Decree of 
Divorce which required him to pay child support for his children 
so long as they were full-time students residing with the appel-
lant. The motion was based on decisions of this Court published 
after the entry of the Decree which established that he could not 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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be required to provide a college education for his children or to 
pay support beyond their 21st birthdays absent special circum-
stances justifying such an order. His motion was premised on the 
argument that changes in the law after the entry of the Decree 
constituted a change of circumstances justifying modification of 
the Decree. He proposed to support the children through the age 
of 21 while they were full-time students residing with respondent 
but to terminate support at age 21. The trial court ruled that 
since he had agreed to support the children so long as they 
resided with respondent and remained in school, the Decree could 
not be modified. 
Appellant appeals from that Order. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's Order 
Denying Modification of the Decree and either an order modifying 
the Decree to terminate the obligation to support his children 
upon their 21st birthday, or, in the alternative, a reversal of 
the trial court's ruling and a remand to the trial court for 
determination of whether, in view of the change of law enunciated 
in the decisions of this Court, and the fact that neither of the 
minor children of the parties to which the child provisions of 
the Decree apply suffer any disability which would require 
support beyond their 21st birthdays, the Decree should be modified 
-2-
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to terminate the appellant's child support obligation upon the 
attainment of the age of 21 of each of said children. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent initially filed a complaint for divorce in 
this matter on November 15, 1973 (Record 2-7). Three years 
thereafter, November 24, 1976, the parties filed with the court a 
property settlement agreement which provided for resolution of 
all of the matters in issue. (Record 94-98). Paragraph III of 
that agreement provided: 
That defendant agrees to pay the plaintiff the 
sum of $1,500.00 per month as alimony and child 
support, said $1,500.00 being $500.00 per month 
alimony and $500.00 per month for each child 
as child support until that child reaches his 
or her majority. The alimony payments shall last 
for a period of ten years from the date of 
Decree of Divorce is entered. (Record 95). 
and the relevant portion of Paragraph IV provided: 
That de~endant additionally agrees that if either 
minor child desires to continue his or her edu-
cation after graduation from high school, then 
the child support shall be paid to the plaintiff 
for the support of that child so long as that 
child resides in the home of and with the plain-
tiff and so long as that child is a fulltime 
student. (Record 95). 
The settlement agreement was presented to and accepted 
by the trial court. The two terms of the stipulation set out 
above were incorporated as Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Findings of 
-3-
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Fact (Record 102) and paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Decree of Divorce 
(Record 105) which was made and entered on November 24, 1976. 
·After the entry of the Decree of Divorce, this Court 
rendered a series of decisions, discussed infra, which estab-
lished that a parent could not, absent special circumstances 
justifying such a requirement, be ordered to pay for the college 
education of his or her children, be required to support his or 
her children between the ages of 18 and 21 and be required to 
support a child beyond the age of 21. 
Appellant determined, based on these decisions, to seek 
modification of the Decree as Susan, the older of the two child-
ren covered by the Decree, approached her 21st birthday. He 
sought to terminate the requirement that he continue to pay 
$500.00 per month as child support for her while Susan and her 
brother resided with respondent and remained as full-time stu-
dents after they attained their 21st birthdays. (Record 276-277, 
295). Susan is a full-time student and resides with the respon-
dent. (Record 252-253). Eric is still a minor. (Record 102). 
Appellant agreed to pay support for the two children 
until their 21st birthdays if they reside with respondent and are 
full-time students, but seeks to have the child support terminate 
for each child on that child's 21st birthday. (Record 276-277, 
2 95) . 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
A CHANGE IN THE LAW CONSTITUTES CHANGE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING THE MODIFICATION 
OF A DECREE OF DIVORCE 
A change of law which has a significant impact upon a 
Decree of Divorce is a change of circumstances which this Court 
should rule requires a trial court to re-examine a Decree of 
Divorce entered before the change to see if the change produced 
a result which justifies modification of the Decree. In the 
instant matter, the trial court refused to even consider doing 
so stating: 
My ruling is that I am simply approving the 
Decree which recognized that he agreed as a 
matter of contract. A deal is a deal. The 
bottom line is that a deal is a deal. 
(Record 295}. 
Judge Rigtrup rejected, without consideration, the argument 
that a change of law is a basis upon which a Decree of Divorce 
entered pursuant to the agreement of the parties, may be modified. 
That is an error which requires reversal by this Court. 
In the instant matter, between the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce and appellant's motion to modify the Decree, 
a series of decisions by this Court established a substantial 
change in the law which require a re-examination of the Decree. 
In English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977}; Carlson v. 
Carlson, 584 P.2d 864 (Utah 1978}; and Harris v. Harris, 585 
-5-
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P.2d 435 (Utah 1978), this Court established that a parent, 
absent special circumstances [such as those set out in Dehn v. 
Dehn, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976)], has no duty to support his 
children beyond the age of 18. 
From the wording of that statute, it could 
hardly be made plainer that the authority 
to extend the obligation of a parent to 
support his child beyond the age of 18 is 
discretionary. We see this as a wise and 
proper legislative recognition of the fact 
that though children attain their majority 
and thus become emancipated at 18, there may 
nevertheless be unusual circumstances where 
the Court would be justified in placing an 
additional burden on parents. However, it 
is to be kept in mind that any discretionary 
power is not absolute, but must be 
exercised with reason and good conscience 
upon the foundation of facts so justifying. 
(emphasis added). 
Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d at 856. 
In that same year it was ruled that trial courts do 
not have the power to require a parent to pay for the college 
education of a child in the absence of compelling special 
circumstances, Ferguson v. Ferguson, 578 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978). 
Based on those rulings, appellant determined that he 
should return to the court for modification of the Decree as 
Susan, the older of the two children covered by the Decree, 
approached her 21st birthday. He sought a modification of the 
Decree to terminate his obligation to pay $500.00 per month as 
child support when Susan attained her 21st birthday in September 
of 1980. He asserted the change or articulation of the law as 
-6-
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thus enunciated, constituted a change of circumstances which 
required the District Court to modify the Decree in this case. 
While this matter was pending, this Court opined in 
two cases which make clear the error of the trial court. In 
Chandler v. West, 610 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1980), it was stated: 
Land v. Land, Utah, 605 P.2d 1248 (1980), 
held that property settlements are entitled 
to greater sanctity than alimony and support 
payments in proceedings to modify divorce 
decrees. However, property settlements are 
not sacrocanct and are not beyond the power 
of a court of equity to modify. 
610 P.2d at 1300. It is thus clear that the sununary action of 
the trial court based on "a deal is a deal" (Record 291-292) is 
a rejection of the rule articulated by this Court that even 
stipulated Decrees are to be re-examined when circumstances 
change. 
Appellant asks this Court to reverse the trial court 
because it summarily rejected his assertion that a change in 
the law is a change in circumstances which justifies re-exami-
nation of the Decree of Divorce. There is no question of fact 
in the instant matter; it is a question of a change in the law. 
It is on this basis that the appellant has pursued this appeal. 
---
In the second decision, Kerr v. Kerr, P.2d 
, Utah, 1980, this Court ruled: 
Defendant next complains of the requirement 
that he pay $450.00 per month for the support 
of his 15-year old son, Stephen, as long as he 
continues to reside with the plaintiff and is 
-7-
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attending college fulltime or serving a 
mission for his church. This objection is 
well taken. u.c.A., 1953, 15-2-1, as amended, 
provides that minors attain their majority at 
age 18 unless sooner married, but that courts 
in divorce actions may order support to age 
21. The Decree here did not limit the support 
to age 21 and more seriously was not based 
upon any finding of circumstances which would 
justify the order compelling the defendant to 
support his son beyond the age of 18. We held 
in Carlson v. Carlson, Utah, 584 P.2d 864 
(1978) that in the absence of such a finding, 
an order of support for a child over 18 cannot 
stand. We appreciate that since Stephen's 
18th birthday was, at the time of trial, more 
than three years in the future, the court 
could not know and therefore, could not find 
what his specific needs would be at age 18. 
We therefore modify the Decree to provide for 
the payment of child support until his 18th 
birthday at which time if support is still 
needed, the plaintiff may petition for a 
continuation of support based upon the circum-
stances existing at that time. P.2d at 
slip opinion at 3-4. 
This is precisely the question raised by appellant in the instant 
matter. The sole difference between the question raised by 
appellant and Kerr v. Kerr, supra, is the fact that appellant 
initially agreed to accept this condition and only when subse-
quent changes in or articulation of the law occurred, did he 
return to the court for a re-evaluation of the Decree -- precisely 
what this Court told the respondent to do in Kerr v. Kerr, 
supra. 
In contrast to Kerr v. Kerr, the agreement between the 
instant parties was negotiated prior to the rules applied in 
Kerr v. Kerr, supra, being articulated by this Court. Until the 
-8-
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law was enunciated, appellant did not know the provisions of the 
Decree exceeded the authority of the trial court. Now, his 
daughter is approaching age 21 and he is required to pay $500.00 
per month in perpetuity while she lives with respondent and 
attends school. His son can follow the same course. He sought a 
ruling from the court that his obligation to pay child support 
should terminate when his daughter reaches age 21. Neither of 
his children suffer any disability nor is there any other factor 
which would justify continuation of support beyond their 18th 
birthdays, but he has accepted that pursuant to his agreement, 
support should continue to age 21. (Record 295). 
The District Court sununarily overruled his motion. If 
the District Court ruling is correct, it would establish a prin-
ciple directly contrary to the overall policy of the law to 
encourage settlements. If, as in Kerr v. Kerr, supra, a case 
goes to trial and a party is ordered to do something that he 
could not legally be required to do, he may appeal or seek to 
modify the order. Under the trial court's ruling in the instant 
matter, however, once he entered into an agreement and the law 
was thereafter modified, this relief would be denied to him. 
Such a ruling would not only discourage entering a settlement, it 
could serve to make an attorney guilty of malpractice were he to 
advise or concur in his client's entering a settlement which 
contained terms which a court later determined invalid. The 
-9-
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attorney would have to insist on trial or risk a malpractice 
action if, following the proffered advice, the client agreed to a 
settlement, then learned he was barred from seeking a modifica-
tion of the Decree while he could ·have done so had he gone to 
trial. 
The errors in the trial court's ruling are manifest and 
require this Court to reverse the decision and order. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court must reverse the trial court and rule that 
when there is a change in the law that has a significant impact 
on the provisions of the Decree of Divorce, including a Decree of 
Divorce entered pursuant to stipulation of the parties, it con-
stitutes a change of circumstances requiring a District Court to 
examine the provisions of the Decree and determine if the change 
in law does require a modification of the Decree. In the instant 
matter, this Court should determine that it does and rule that 
the obligation of the appellant to support his children in the 
sum of $500.00 per month so long as they are full-time students 
and reside with the respondent, terminates when each of the said 
children attains the age of 21. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this :2>9 day of July, 1980. 
Cf)~E;J~ 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
of and for 
PARSONS, BERLE & LATIMER 
79 South State Street 
P. o. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: ( 8 01) 532-1234 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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